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PROBLEMS OF FINALITY OF
JUDGMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF
APPEAL IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
In Missouri, an aggrieved' party generally may appeal only from a
final judgment of a trial court.2 This final judgment rule, which has been a
prerequisite to appealability in Missouri since 1822, 3 originated with the
common law writs of error as a means of preserving the integrity of the
record.4 Today, however, the rule is supported on the ground that by
precluding piecemeal appeals it promotes judicial economy. 5
The Missouri General Assembly has never provided a definition of the
term "final judgment. 6 One must instead look to the cases, where it is
usually stated that, "for a judgment to be final and appealable it must
dispose of all the parties and all the issues and leave nothing for further
1. The requirement that a party be "aggrieved" before appealing is
regularly enforced in Missouri. See Conrad v. Herndon, 572 S.W.2d 216, 219
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); Morris v. Patterson, 549 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1977); In re Marriage of Richardson, 540 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1976); Pilat v. Kristoff, 494 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
2. RSMO § 512.020 (1978). This statute also provides for appellate review
from (1) an order granting a new trial; (2) an order refusing to revoke, modify, or
change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver or receivers, or dissolving an
injunction; and (3) an interlocutory judgment in a partition suit which deter-
mines the rights of the parties. Interlocutory orders which are not included in §
512.020 are generally not appealable. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Siegel-Robert
Plating Co., 483 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Orfv. Computer Inst.,
480 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Hoevelman v. Reorganized School
Dist. R-2, 430 S.W.2d 753 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968). However, some review is
available through the use of extraordinary writs. See generally Tuchler, Discre-
tionary Interlocutory Review in Missouri: Judicial Abuse of the Writ, 40 MO. L.
REV. 577 (1975).
3. Mo. Laws 1822, § 51, at 853, compiled in LAWS OF A PUBLIC AND
GENERALNATURE, OFTHED ISTRICT OFL OUISIANA, OFTHETERRITORY OFL ouI-
SIANA, OF THETERRITORY OFMISSOURI AND OF THESTATE OFMISSOURI, UP TO
THEYEAR 1824 (1842).
4. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539,
541-43 (1932).
5. Weir v. Brune, 364 Mo. 415, 417, 262 S.W.2d 597, 599 (1953); Com-
ment, Requiem For the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292, 292-93
(1966); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 351
(1961).
6. The definition in the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure is inadequate.
Rule 74.01 states that "A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the
parties in the action."
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determination."7 Although this definition of a final judgment is seemingly
a model of clarity, application of the rule has caused numerous problems
for Missouri courts and practitioners as evidenced by the more than sixty
published appellate decisions that have dealt with final judgments in the
three year period from 1976 through 1978.8 Two issues in particular have
caused the most difficulties: (1) finality of a partial decision in a case in-
volving multiple claims; and (2) judgments which may not be final even
though the trial court disposed of all the claims.
II. FINALITY OF PARTIAL DECISIONS
A. Introduction
In Missouri, when a judgment is rendered as to less than all the claims
in a multiple claim lawsuit, that judgment ordinarily is unappealable
because it lacks finality.9 It will remain non-final until the trial court has
disposed of all the remaining claims. If a court dismisses one of several
claims, or renders a judgment but neglects to include one of the claims or
counterclaims in that judgment, there is usually no right to an immediate
appeal.' 0 This is true even though in the case of a dismissal, the court's ac-
tion has the effect of a final judgment as to the dismissed claim since it
completely disposes of that issue or party for purposes of the present litiga-
tion.
The leading case in this area is Bolin v. Farmers Alliance Mutual In-
surance Co.," in which decedent's heirs and personal representative
brought suit on an insurance policy against the insurer and the designated
beneficiary. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the
insurance company but did not dismiss the beneficiary until four days
later. Plaintiffs appealed from the summary judgment for the insurer, and
7. Beezley v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1971). See also Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Mo. En Banc
1974); Dotson v. E.W. Bacharach, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Mo. 1959).
8. E.g., Bolin v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins: Co., 549 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. En
Banc 1977); Marsch v. Williams, 575 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); In
re Marriage of Allen, 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); Walker v.
Walker, 553 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); White v. Robertson-Drago
Funeral Home, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Coggburn v.
Watts, 540 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976); Estate of Sample v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 534 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
9. See Dudeck v. Ellis, 376 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Mo. 1964); Massey v.
Hamilton, 564 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); Starnes v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 503 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973); Coonis v. Rogers,
413 S.W.2d 310, 313-14 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
10. See Summit Lumber Co. v. Higginbothan, 570 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1978); Mullen v. Dike Dev. Co., 560 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1977); P.I.C. Leasing, Inc. v. Roy A. Scheperle Constr. Co., 489 S.W.2d 219
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
11. 549 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
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the appeal was dismissed by the Springfield District of the Court of Ap-
peals.' 2 The case was then ordered transferred to the Missouri Supreme
Court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that since the trial court
had not dealt with the claim against the beneficiary at the time it ruled for
the insurance company, there was no final judgment in the action.13 In
reaching this result the court did not accept plaintiffs' arguments that the
summary judgment for the insurance company was final since it rendered
moot the claim against the beneficiary,' 4 or that the later dismissal of the
beneficiary, which disposed of the remaining issues, transformed the sum-
mary judgment order into a final judgment:
We should not approve an approach which makes it necessary for
the appellate court to decide whether a resolution of the case as to
one defendant makes the case moot as to the other, or which makes
it necessary for the appellate court to piece and tack together
various parts of the record, none of which purport to be a final
judgment, and conclude therefrom that collectively they amount
to a final judgment. '5
Until the trial court issued an additional judgment which incorporated
both the summary judgment and the dismissal, the summary judgment
order as to the insurer remained non-final and therefore unappealable.
The Bolin decision emphasizes the respect Missouri appellate courts
have for the final judgment rule. The supreme court in Bolin gave great
weight to the fact that since there was no clear final judgment issued in the
case, there was no way to be certain that the trial court had completed its
adjudication of the claims. The supreme court could have simply allowed
the appeal of the summary judgment to stand and ignored the claim
against the beneficiary. Instead it chose to dismiss the appeal of a partial
trial court decision. It would seem, therefore, that Missouri appellate
courts in multiple claim suits are to postpone appeals until the entire case
can be reviewed as a single unit.
This approach of waiting for a final adjudication of all claims, so there
can be one appeal which consolidates all alleged errors, clearly minimizes
the already heavy burden on Missouri appellate courts. Also it presumably
gives the reviewing courts a heightened perspective in a multiple claim case
instead of the limited overview afforded by numerous appeals. However,
at times, this approach can cause hardship to the litigants. For example,
the trial court in Bolin, after having rendered summary judgment for the
defendant insurance company, might have proceeded to try alone the
claim against the beneficiary. In this instance the rest of the trial would
have been unfair to the remaining parties since the claims were dependent
12. Id. at 887.
13. Id. at 889.
14. See Hupp v. Murphy Fin. Co., 502 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1973).
15. 549 S.W.2d at 891. See also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pittcock,
572 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978).
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on each other. If it were then determined on appeal, after the claim
against the beneficiary had been litigated to judgment, that the summary
judgment order was erroneous, the entire case would have had to have
been retried. The increased costs and added delay of retrial, however,
could have been lessened had there been prompt review. Application of
the final judgment rule therefore can have a severe impact on some multi-
ple claim suits.
B. The Exceptions-Rule 81.06
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 81.0616 mitigates somewhat the possible
unfairness of postponing appeals of partial decisions until there is a final
judgment. This rule lists several exceptions whereby judgments disposing
of less than all the claims may be final for purposes of appeal.
Supreme Court Rule 81.06, which at first glance appears unwieldy
and difficult to understand, can be broken down into three more com-
prehensible sections:'"
(1) When a separate trial of any claim is ordered in any case and a
jury trial thereof is had, the separate judgment entered upon the
verdict shall be deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal.
(2) When a separate trial is had before the court without a jury of
claims arising out of the same transactions, occurrences or subject
matter as the other claims stated or joined in the case, the judg-
ment entered shall not be deemed a final judgment for purposes of
appeal unless specifically so designated by the court in the judg-
ment entered.
(3)When a separate trial is had before the court without a jury of
an entirely separate and independent claim unrelated to any other
claims stated or joined in the case, the judgment entered shall be
deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal, unless the court
orders it entered as an interlocutory judgment to be held in
abeyance until other claims are determined.
The first section dealing with finality and separate jury trials of severable
claims apparently has caused no difficulties for Missouri courts and practi-
tioners. Nearly all the litigation has instead centered around the second
and third sections, which concern separate trials of severable claims heard
by a court without a jury. 18
To understand the second and third sections of Supreme Court Rule
81.06, the term "separate trial" must first be defined. Clearly, the term en-
compasses those situations where the trial judge, in a multiple issue suit,
enters an order severing some of the claims for separate trial.' 9 However,
16. Mo.R. CIv.P. 81.06.
17. Dalton v. Borger, 562 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
18. See, e.g., Conrad v. Herndon, 572 S.W.2d 216, 217-19 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1978); Brown v. Brown, 444 S.W.2d 1, 4 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Lynch
v. Webb City School Dist. No. 92, 373 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
19. See New Age Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Mo. 1970);
730 [Vol. 44
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"separate trial" has also been interpreted to encompass the frequent cases
where all the claims in a non-jury case are tried together, but a hearing is
held on a motion for summary judgment or dismissal of less than all of
those claims. If such a motion is sustained after a hearing, the hearing, for
purposes of rule 81.06, is a separate trial.20 If, however, the motion is over-
ruled, the hearing is deemed non-separate, and the order of denial is
merely interlocutory and therefore unappealable. 2 1 This interpretation,
which greatly broadens the scope of applicability of rule 81.06, is very im-
portant because, as long as the remaining criteria of the rule are fulfilled, a
Missouri practitioner may immediately appeal any order of summary
judgment or dismissal. The hardship, cost and time loss caused by waiting
for the outcome of the remaining claims can thereby be avoided. However,
as will be seen, the remaining criteria of rule 81.06 are often difficult to
meet.
One way a partial decision rendered during a "separate trial" may be
appealable is to ask the circuit judge to designate on the record22 that the
judgment is final pursuant to the last clause of the second section of rule
81.06. If such a designation is made, there is a right of immediate appeal 23
without the necessity of satisfying the criteria of section three of rule 81.06.
In essence, the judge, by making the designation, is certifying that the trial
as to the disposed claim or claims is complete and that there is no reason to
delay appellate review. The only problem with this approach is that no
elucidation of the "same transaction or occurrence" standard is provided
in the rule to guide Missouri circuit judges in making these designations of
finality.24 Such decisions have been left almost completely to the discretion
of the trial courts. 25 Therefore, this exception to the final judgment rule
can be very unpredictable.
K.C. Power & Light Co. v. City of Kansas City, 426 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Mo. 1968);
Hahn v. Hahn, 544 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Rakestraw v. Nor-
ris, 469 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Spr. Mo. App. 1971).
20. See Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 376-77 (Mo. En Banc 1974);
Johnson v. Great Heritage Life Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1973); Title Ins. Corp. v. United States, 432 S.W.2d 787, 790 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968).
21. See Wilson v. Hungate, 434 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Mo. 1968); Hoevelman v.
Reorganized School Dist. R-2, 430 S.W.2d 753, 754-55 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968).
22. See Snyder v. Alder, 514 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
23. See Selsor v. Zenith Radio Corp., 536 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Mo. En Banc
1976); Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Feinstein v.
Edward Livingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. 1970); Talkington v.
J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 528 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
24. The relevant clause in rule 81.06 merely states that a judgment is not
final "unless specifically so designated by the court in the judgment entered."
25. Rarely will a Missouri appellate court overturn a trial judge's designa-
tion of finality. But see State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Armacost Motors,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. 1973) (Missouri Supreme Court held unap-
pealable a judgment designated as final in condemnation proceeding). This is
true even though a great many appellate cases have begun by stating that it is the
1979]
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When a Missouri circuit judge refuses to designate a dismissed claim as
final, the practitioner is forced to rely on the test in section three of rule
81.06 if an immediate appeal is desired. In this situation, however, he is
placed in an immediate quandary: Since both tests in rule 81.06 refer to
non-jury cases involving separate trials of severable claims, must he show
that the dismissed claim did not arise out of the "same transaction or oc-
currence" as the remaining claims, or that "separate and independent"
claims are involved? Arguably these are different tests; the test in the se-
cond section is not just a restatement in the negative of the one in the
third.26 Therefore, since the tests are not the same and the rule gives no
further guidance as to which one should be argued on appeal, both tests
seemingly must be fulfilled in order for a judgment to be final under rule
81.06.
Perhaps partially owing to this lack of clarity surrounding the ap-
plicability of the tests, Missouri appellate courts have been reluctant to
permit an appeal of a partial decision in the absence of a judgment
designated as final by the trial judge. The test in section three of rule 81.06
has rarely been met. 27 In most of the cases, the courts only apply the test in
reviewing court's duty to determine whether a judgment is actually final. See
Dudeck v. Ellis, 376 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Mo. 1964); Dotson v. E.W. Bacharach,
Inc., 325 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Mo. 1959); Deeds v. Foster, 235 S.W.2d 262, 265
(Mo. 1951); P.I.C. Leasing, Inc. v. Roy A. Scheperle Constr. Co., 489 S.W.2d
219, 221 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); Beezley v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
464 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Spr. Mo. App. 1971).
26. Actually, it may be more difficult to establish that the dismissed claim is
"separate and independent" from the remaining claims than to show merely that
it does not arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence." The facts of State ex
rel. Ashcroft v. Gibbar, 575 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978), illustrate
this contention. The State of Missouri brought an action against James and Faye
Gibbar, owners of a subdivision, for dumping raw sewage into a sink hole running
beneath Perry Plaza Shopping Center and eventually leaching into waters of the
state. The Gibbars filed a third party petition stating two causes of action,one of
which asked for money damages from Perry Plaza, Inc. for breach of an agree-
ment between Perry and the Gibbars' predecessor in title to accept sewage into a
system to be built on land owned by Perry. At trial, the circuit court dismissed the
third party petition, but did not designate the order as final. Any appeal from this
dismissal would fail under routine rule 81.06 analysis. The third party petition
dealing with the prior agreement clearly did not arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the remaining claim brought by the State. However, the ap-
pellate court could not recognize the dismissal as final since the claims are fac-
tually related, and therefore not separate and independent.
27. Only five cases have been found which have allowed immediate appeal
of a partial judgment absent a designation of finality by the trial judge: Elliott v.
Harris, 423 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. En Banc 1968) (summary judgment on buyer's
claim in joint action to recover amounts paid for purchase of working interests in
oil leases held appealable); State ex rel. Aschroft v. Gibbar, 575 S.W.2d 924 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1978) (see note 26 supra); Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
527 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975) (see text accompanying notes 30-32
infra); Hauser v. Hill, 510 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) (declaratory
judgment on question of insurance liability in one count held appealable in
732 [Vol. 44
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the second section and hold that if the dismissed claims arise out of the
same transactions or occurrences as the remaining claims, they cannot be
final. 28 Since almost all counts in a multiple claim suit can be characteriz-
ed in some way as arising out of the same transactions or occurrences, it is
not hard to perceive why nearly all such appeals are dismissed in Missouri.
A few recent decisions, however, in an effort to permit more appeals of
partial judgments and to thereby avoid the potential prejudice and ex-
pense of delaying appellate review, have adopted a more liberal approach
in applying the tests in rule 81.06.29 In Crenshaw v. Great Central In-
surance Co.,S° a multiple claim suit was brought against an insurer to
recover under an uninsured motorist policy for the death of the insured in
an automobile accident. Count I sought wrongful death recovery, while
counts II and III sought general recovery under the policy. At trial count I
was dismissed because the statute of limitations period for wrongful death
actions had run. This judgment was not designated as final. The St. Louis
District of the Court of Appeals held that the dismissed claim was ap-
pealable under rule 81.06 even though all three claims arose out of the
same subject matter, namely, the automobile accident.31 The court gloss-
ed over this apparent difficulty and pointed out that rule 81.06 instead
"speaks to a situation where the several claims, counts, etc. are dependent
upon each other."3 2 Since the disposition of the remaining claims in Cren-
shaw was not dependent in any respect on the outcome of the dismissed
wrongful death count, the disrissal was a final judgment for purposes of
appeal.
This "dependency" test, which apparently is a variation on the
"separate and independent" language in the third section of rule 81.06,
has been employed in only a few other cases.33 Its use greatly broadens the
scope of applicability of the rule. The Missouri Supreme Court, however,
has yet to speak on the test's propriety.
Rule 81.06 thus provides some limited exceptions to the final judg-
ment rule in Missouri. While important, the rule has engendered far too
multiple count suit arising out of automobile accident); Brown v. Brown, 444
S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969) (wife's claim for annulment of marriage and
custody of child held appealable even though husband's counterclaim had not
been decided).
28. See Byous v. Lawshee, 475 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1972); Dotson v. E.W.
Bacharach, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1959); Schumacher v. Sheahan Inv. Co.,
424 S.W.2d 84 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Ramatowski v. Ramatowski, 414 S.W.2d
827 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
29. See State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Gibbar, 575 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1978); Conrad v. Herndon, 572 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); Cren-
shaw v. Great Cent. Life Ins. Co., 527 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
30. 527 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Gibbar, 575 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1978); Conrad v. Herndon, 572 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
1979] 733
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many difficulties for Missouri courts and practitioners. To eliminate some
of these difficulties several aspects of this rule should be changed. First,
that the term "separate trial" also encompasses hearings wherein motions
for summary judgment or dismissal are sustained needs to be made clear.
At present, the practitioner can discover this only by in-depth analysis of
the cases.3 4 Second, the tests for finality in the second and third sections of
the rule should be amended so that they clearly employ the same standard.
The present scheme, wherein two tests may apply to the same situation, is
too confusing. If these tests are not equalized, at the very least a further ex-
planation needs to be added as to when each should be employed. Third,
the rule arguably should be changed so as to give the appellate courts more
discretion in recognizing partial decisions as final in those cases where the
parties would be prejudiced by delayed review. At the present time, in
such cases, if the trial judge refuses to certify the judgment as final, an ap-
peal is almost foreclosed since the test in section three of rule 81.06 is
generally so difficult to meet. These three amendments would clarify the
language in rule 81.06 and at the same time lessen some of the unfairness
caused by application of the final judgment rule to appeals of partial deci-
sions.
Until these changes are made, the practitioner should keep the follow-
ing five factors in mind if faced with a partial decision in a multiple claim
case:
(1) If an immediate appeal is desired and the dismissal of one claim
renders the remaining claims moot, request that the trial judge
consolidate the other claims in the judgment so that the entire case
is final;
(2) If number one is not possible, be aware that the hearing for
summary judgment or dismissal should be treated as a separate
trial so that Supreme Court Rule 81.06 may be applicable;
(3) If the partial decision is a "separate trial," request that the trial
judge designate the judgment as final on the record for purposes of
appeal;
(4) If the trial judge refuses to designate the partial decision as
final, frame the appellate argument in terms of the "dependency"
test, not the more difficult "same transactions or occurrences" test;
and
(5) If an immediate appeal is not desired, request that the trial
judge designate the dismissed claim as interlocutory.3 5 Otherwise
34. That many attorneys are unaware of the full definition of the term
"separate trial" is shown by the fact that in a great many appeals of partial deci-
sions, rule 81.06 is not even mentioned. For example, in Bolin v. Farmers
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 549 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. En Banc 1977), neither party even
cited rule 81.06 in their briefs before the supreme court.
35. The last clause of the third section of rule 81.06 provides that certain
judgments are final "unless the court orders it entered as an interlocutory judg-
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it might later be determined, after the time for an appeal has run,
that the partial judgment was final when entered.
If these things are kept in mind, rule 81.06 should present fewer problems.
III. THE MAKE-UP OF AFINALJUDGMENT
The final judgment rule has also been employed on numerous occa-
sions in Missouri to dismiss appeals for lack of finality, even though the
trial court has apparently completed its activities and has disposed of all
claims.3 6 By sending these cases back, the appellate courts are essentially
saying that the trial court in some way either handled improperly or left
out a required step in its adjudication. Since the trial court judgment is
somehow inadequate, it cannot be final, and without a final judgment the
appellate courts lack jurisdiction 7 to review the decision.
Most of the appeals in this area were dismissed because the trial court
failed to formally decree that the judgments were final.3 8 However, in a
few special types of proceedings the judgments were held to be non-final
because the trial court improperly disposed of the issues. For example, in
an adoption proceeding, the judgment cannot merely grant custody of the
child in question, it must also terminate the natural father's and mother's
parental rights.3 9 Likewise in a declaratory judgment action, the trial
court judgment, in order to be final, must include a declaration of the
rights of the parties;40 merely dismissing the action is inadequate.
The most important of these special proceedings, though, has been the
dissolution.
A. Finality of Dissolutions
Under section 452.305 of the Missouri Divorce Reform Act, 4 1 a circuit
court in a dissolution proceeding "shall" dissolve the marriage: (1) if the
court has determined that the personal jurisdiction requirements have
been met; (2) if the court has found that the marriage is irretrievably
36. See Marsch v. Williams, 575 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978);
Gray v. Bryant, 557 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Corley v. McGaugh,
555 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
37. See Dampier v. Nichols, 570 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Gothard v. Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978).
38. See Lawrence v. Steadley Co., 566 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1978); White v. Robertson-Drago Funeral Home, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 47 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1977); Williams v. Williams, 480 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1972).
39: See Marsch v. Williams, 575 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1978). See also In re Beste, 515 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. 1974); In re Adoption of LLV,
457 S.W.2d 2 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
40. See Win. A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.2d
865, 867 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
41. RSMo§§ 452.300-.415 (1978).
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broken; and (3) if the court, to the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, has
considered, approved or made provision for child custody and support,
maintenance of either spouse, and the disposition of property. Although
this section only requires that a circuit court, as a minimum, "consider"
the disposition of property, 42 a number of recent decisions have held that if
the circuit court, at the time of entering the decree of dissolution, does not
actually divide the marital property43 or divides it improperly, there can be
no final judgment in the proceeding. 44
A decision that such a judgment is not final has been reached by the
courts through the application of the language of a separate section,
452.330.1, in place of section 452.305(3). Section 452.330.1, which sug-
gests factors to be considered in the disposition of property, states inter
alia: "In a proceeding . . . for dissolution of marriage . . . the court
. . .shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court
deems just .... ,,4" This language, since it employs the word "shall," has
been interpreted as imposing a mandatory requirement that a Missouri
circuit court divide the marital property at the time the decree of dissolu-
tion is entered. 46 Therefore, if a circuit court does not divide the property,
the judgment lacks the requisite finality and the court retains jurisdiction
of the cause since that court failed to meet the requirements of the
Missouri Divorce Reform Act as interpreted by the courts of appeals.47
42. RSMo§ 452.305(3) (1978).
43. Marital property is defined for purposes of the Missouri Divorce Reform
Act in RSMO§ 452.330.2 (1978). If property is not defined as marital property, it
is separate property and must be set aside to its owner by the court in a dissolution
proceeding. Id. § 452.330.1.
44. See In re Marriage of Allen, 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Anspach v. Anspach, 557 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Corder v. Cor-
der, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
45. RSMo § 452.330.1 (1978). The constitutionality of this section was
upheld in Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
46. See Daffin v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978);
Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); L.F.H. v.
R.L.H., 543 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976). The statement of the
court in L.F.H. v. R.L.H. is typical: "By using the word 'shall,' the legislature has
indicated that the trial court must specifically decree a division of the marital
property upon dissolution of the marriage." 543 S.W.2d at 522. But see State ex
rel. McTague v. McClellan, 532 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976);
Waeckerle v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 525 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1975) (use of the word "shall" excludes discretion on the part of the trial
court).
47. Although not raised in the cases, the Missouri Court of Appeals' inter-
pretation of the Divorce Reform Act suggests an obvious question: If the Missouri
General Assembly intended that the division of marital property be mandatory,
why did it also include language in § 452.305.1(3) that a court need only "con-
sider" the disposition of property? Perhaps another interpretation of these sec-
tions should therefore be considered: In a dissolution proceeding, a circuit court
only has to "consider" the disposition of the marital property, but if it decides to
make a division, it "must" divide the property in just proportions after consider-
ing all relevant factors, including those in § 452.330.1.
[Vol. 44
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No explanation, however, has been given as to why the mandatory
language of section 452.330.1 is to be read in place of section 452.305(3).
The cases have not discussed it. There is also no published legislative
history of the Missouri Divorce Reform Act to lend insight. The only clue is
suggested by the fact that the property sections of the Missouri Act are very
similar to those of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 48 which was ap-
proved by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in August, 1970.49 The in-
tentions of the Commissioners therefore may have influenced the Missouri
Act, and so could provide some guidance in its interpretation.
As has been pointed out by Professor Krauskopf, one of the reasons the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws gave courts the power to divide marital
property was to ensure that wives in a no-fault divorce system obtained
their share of the marital property at dissolution. 50 There was fear that if
fault considerations, which have been considered by many members of the
bar as frequently giving wives leverage in dictating a fair property settle-
ment, were removed without giving the courts the power to divide marital
assets, wives in many instances would not receive a fair portion of the pro-
perty. 5' The Commissioners' concern for the property interests of wives at
dissolution can also be read into the recent Missouri cases in this area. In
nearly all these decisions, the appellate court has sent the case back to the
trial court in order that a distribution or redistribution of the marital pro-
perty could be made which benefited the wife. 52 If this common theme is
an accurate representation of the policy of the Missouri Court of Appeals,
it provides a plausible explanation as to why section 452.330.1 is being
employed in place of section 452.305(3): Making the division of property
mandatory rather than discretionary is a good way to look after dependent
spouses' interests at dissolution.
Even though the basis for the Missouri courts' statutory interpretation
is somewhat uncertain, the cases which have dealt with final judgments
and the disposition of marital property have been consistent. To begin
with, a Missouri circuit court in a dissolution proceeding must actually
divide the marital property even where the court is not requested to do so
48. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307; Krauskopf, A Theory
For 'Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165, 166
(1976).
49. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM LAWS 111 (1970).
50. Krauskopf, supra note 48, at 170.
51. Id.
52. See In re Marriage of Allen, 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Daffin v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); State ex rel. Brewer
v. Sheehan, 565 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978); Anspach v. Anspach,
557 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977). But see Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1976) (trial court should not have given wife an interest in husband's cor-
poration).
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by either husband or wife to ensure finality of the judgment. 53 For exam-
ple, in State ex rel. Brewer v. Sheehan,5 4 both parties had testified in the
dissolution action that they had previously agreed to divide their assets
equally. Therefore, the trial court, when it entered the decree of dissolu-
tion in 1975, made no order disposing of the property. Later, when the an-
ticipated division by the parties failed to materialize, the wife brought a se-
cond suit for partition of their real estate. In 1978 the St. Louis District of
the Court of Appeals ordered the second court to dismiss this partition
suit. The court said that since the original court had not "fulfilled its
statutory mandate" of actually dividing the property for the parties, it
had not yet exhausted its jurisdiction. 55 There was no final judgment, and
the case was remanded to the circuit court for disposition of the real estate
even though almost three years had passed since the decree had been
entered.5 6
A Missouri circuit court also cannot divide only some of the marital
property; it must divide it all. If the dissolution decree fails to mention how
every item of property is to be distributed, cases have held that there can
be no final judgment in the action. 57 For instance, in Anspach v.
Anspach" the appeal was dismissed for lack of finality because the trial
court neglected to decide the parties' interests in the husband's retirement
fund.59 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Allen 60 the appeal was dismissed
after review of the trial transcript showed that the parties each had some
personal property which was not disposed of in the decree. 61 In neither of
53. See Chenoweth v. Chenoweth, 575 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1978); State ex rel. Brewer v. Sheehan, 565 S.W.2d 850, 850 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1978).
54. 565 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
55. Id. at 850. Judge Smith pointed out that there was no final judgment
even though the original court's failure to divide the marital property was induc-
ed by the representations of one of the parties rather than by the court's own er-
ror. 565 S.W.2d at 851.
56. The fact that neither husband nor wife in Brewer had originally asked
the court to divide the marital property was not a problem to the St. Louis District
of the Court of Appeals. A year before, in 1977, the same court had held that a
circuit court in such a case should merely treat both parties' pleadings as though
amended by consent to request such action. These amendments are accomplish-
ed through application of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.33(b). Hulsey v.
Hulsey, 550 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
57. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1978); Anspach v. Anspach, 577 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Hulsey v.
Hulsey, 550 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); L.F.H. v. R.L.H., 543
S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
58. 557 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
59. Id. at 6.
60. 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978).
61. Id. at 353. An alternative holding in this case was that the judgment was
not final because the circuit court also had failed to vest custody of the child in
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these cases was there a finding that any of the undivided property was ac-
tually marital property, or the sole property of one of the parties. However,
until that determination was made, and the property was dealt with by the
court, there could be no final judgment.
Additionally, when a Missouri circuit court does dispose of the marital
assets, it must dispose of them properly. An improper disposition is not a
"division of marital property" for purposes of the Missouri Act. 62
Therefore there can be no final judgment in such a case. For example, in
Daffin v. Daffin,6 3 the Kansas City District of the Court of Appeals
remanded the case after concluding that the trial court's award to the wife
of $175 per month from the husband's $500 monthly military pension was
not a proper disposition 6 4 of that marital asset. In the court's words: "The
award merely adjudges but does not separate the two disparate property
interests accorded the wife in the pension benefit."6 5 Merely separating the
property interests of the parties in a particular marital asset, however, may
not always ensure a proper disposition. In Corder v. Corder,66 the Kansas
City District of the Court of Appeals held that there was no final judgment
in a dissolution proceeding because the trial court had improperly made
the parties tenants in common6 7 in what had formerly been marital real
estate. The court pointed out that the legislature, in the interest of prevent-
ing further disputes and ill feelings between the spouses,"6 intended that a
62. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 806 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
63. 567 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
64. Related to this issue of proper disposition of marital assets are two recent
cases which hold that where one of the parties to the dissolution is unavailable and
must be served by publication, the notice of publication must "describe" all of the
marital property or the court cannot divide any of the property. In re Marriage of
Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Duncan v. Duncan, 550
S.W.2d 623 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977). The most thorough explanation is pro-
vided in Breen, where the available party listed all the marital real estate in the
notice of publication but neglected to mention the personal property, beyond
reciting that the purpose of the dissolution proceeding inter alia was "to dispose
of all property rights under this marriage." 560 S.W.2d at 364. The court, per
Judge Shangler, held that this statement failed to meet the requirements of
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 54.17 which strictly mandates that the notice of
publication state "a description of any property to be affected" by the judgment.
"This requirement for a published description of the property is more than mere
etiquette, it is the means by which the res is brought to the control of the court
and enables the tribunal to affect the property interest of the absent party even in
her absence." 560 S.W.2d at 364. Since the requisite jurisdiction was lacking, the
trial court should not have divided the marital property.
While logical in its approach, the Breen case places a heavy burden on the
available party in dissolutions by publication. Must every item of personal pro-
perty be listed in the notice of publication in order for the court to be able to pro-
ceed? What if the parties have marital property in several different counties? The
cases have yet to answer these questions.
65. 567 S.W.2d at 679.
66. 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
67. Id. at 800.
68. See Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
1979]
13
Curran: Curran: Problems of Finality of Judgments for Purposes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
division of property "effect a complete severance of all unity of possession,
as well as unity of title.16 9 Therefore, a division which leaves the parties as
tenants in common should be reserved for the unusual situation where "the
economics involved call for a division which stops short of severing the rela-
tionship." 70 Since no "economics" could be found to justify a tenancy in
common in Corder, the trial court's disposition of the property was im-
proper and did not amount to a division of marital property as mandated
by section 452.330.1.71
An important implication of these cases remains to be examined: If a
dissolution case is remanded on the ground that no final order has been
entered because the trial court did not divide the marital property, is it on-
ly the property disposition which is not final, or is the dissolution of mar-
riage not final as well? Ordinarily when an appeal is dismissed because the
judgment lacks finality, the entire matter, not just part, is still subject to
the trial court's jurisdiction.72 However, if this rule applies in dissolution
cases, the divorce decree is void and the parties remain married. 73
The Missouri courts have dismissed these appeals without discussion of
this question.7 4 Kentucky, though, with a divorce act very similar to
Missouri's, 75 has squarely faced the issue. In Putnam v. Fanning,76 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a trial court can enter a final dissolu-
tion decree even though it reserves until later any determination of proper-
ty disposition or maintenance. In Kentucky, therefore, the court's failure
to divide the marital property at the time the dissolution is granted has no
effect on the finality of the divorce decree.
Support for following the Putnam decision in Missouri dissolution
cases can be found in section 452.360.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
This section states that "[a] decree of dissolution of marriage ... is final
when entered, subject to the right of appeal. 7 7 Since the language of this
69. 546 S.W.2d at 805.
70. Id. The Corder court never explained what "economics" would support
granting a tenancy in common. It merely found that none were present in the
Corder situation. 546 S.W.2d at 806.
71. 546 S.W.2d at 806.
72. Seeking a dissolution of marriage and disposition of marital property
are not two separate claims; therefore, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 81.06, which
speaks to multiple claim lawsuits, would have no applicability. See Mo. R. CiV.
P. 81.06, partially set out in text accompanying note 17 supra.
73. This conclusion is in line with the Missouri Court of Appeals' supposed
policy of protecting wives at dissolution: .In most instances, husbands who are in
favor of the divorce would be unlikely to secrete marital property if such action
meant the dissolution was void.
74. See In re Marriage of Allen, 570 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Anspach v. Anspach, 557 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 532 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
75. KY. REV. STAT. §§ 403.140,.190 (Supp. 1978).
76. 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973).
77. RSMo§ 452.360.1 (1978). See State ex rel. Nilges v. Rush, 532 S.W.2d
740 [Vol. 44
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statute leaves open little room for interpretation, it would appear that in
Missouri, when a court fails to divide marital property at dissolution, only
the property disposition aspect of the dissolution is not final.7 8 Interesting-
ly, though, section 452.360.1 has never been mentioned in a Missouri deci-
sion in this area. For this reason the practitioner, if presented with such a
case, would be well-advised to bring this statute to the court's attention so
that on remand there may be no questions regarding the status of the mar-
riage.
In summary, in order for a judgment in a dissolution proceeding to be
final, the trial court must actually divide all of the marital assets whether
or not the parties request it, and must divide those assets properly. If,
however, a judgment is not final because one of these requirements is not
met, only the division of marital property should be still subject to the trial
court's jurisdiction; the marriage should remain dissolved.
B. The Judgment Entry
As noted earlier, 79 most of the appeals that have been dismissed in
Missouri even though the trial court disposed of all issues were sent back
because the appellate court could not be certain that the judgment
rendered below was final. This has particularly been a problem in the
Springfield District of the Court of Appeals, where at least fifteen reported
decisions were dismissed on this basis in the years 1977 and 1978.80
In Missouri, when a verdict is reached by a jury, or a judgment is
rendered by a court without a jury, it is recorded by the court reporter for
preservation in the trial transcript. Neither amounts to a final judgment at
that time; both are findings that one of the parties is entitled to a judg-
ment, rather than actual and absolute sentences of law.si They remain
857, 859-60 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975), in which the court held that insofar as an
appeal is concerned, the judgment in a dissolution proceeding does not become
final until 30 days after its entry absent the timely filing of a motion for new trial.
78. If this were not the case, and divorce decrees were not final as well,
severe legal consequences could entail. For one thing, neither party to a dissolu-
tion would be able to remarry for fear of criminal liability for bigamy. Also,
former marital real estate would be unmarketable since the title examiner could
never be certain that the husband's and wife's tenancy by the entireties was ac-
tually severed by the dissolution.
79. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
80. E.g., Dampier v. Nichols, 570 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Lawrence v. Steadley Co., 566 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); Corning
Bank v. Hager, 560 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); In re Purvis, 558
S.W.2d 413 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);Corley v. McGaugh, 555 S.W.2d 376 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1977); Matthews v. Turner, 549 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1977).
81. 1 H. BLACK, JUDGMENTS§ 3, at 8 (2d ed. 1902).
1979]
15
Curran: Curran: Problems of Finality of Judgments for Purposes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
mere docket 2 or record 3 entries until they are transformed into judgment
entries. This transformation requires three steps: the docket entry must be
typed up by whomever is responsible, it must be supplemented by the re-
quisite language such as "It is so ordered" 84 or "Judgment in accordance
with said verdict,"8 and the document must be signed by the circuit judge.
These judgment entries, which certify to interested parties that all litiga-
tion has been completed, are then recorded in the trial transcript, usually
just below the original findings. 8 The entries are dated back to when the
findings were made;87 thirty days therefrom they become final and ap-
pealable. 8
An examination of the transcripts of a number of cases from the
Springfield District of the Court of Appeals which were sent back for lack
of finality reveals that in most instances the attorneys attempted to appeal
from the trial court's docket entry. 9 No judgment entry was even made
up. Since, according to the Springfield court, a docket entry cannot be a
final judgment,90 these appeals were dismissed. For example, in Gray v.
Bryant,91 the court's docket entry read: "Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and against Defendants in the total sum of FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE AND 27/100 DOLLARS in accordance
with the jury verdict. Costs taxed against the Defendants. " 92 Although this
82. See Gothard v. Spradling,'561 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1978); Gray v. Bryant, 557 S.W.2d 489, 489 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); First State
Bank v. Brown, 549 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Cochran v.
DeShazo, 538 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
83. See Transcript at 407, Perry v. Briscoe, 568 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1978).
84. Supp. Transcript at 4, First State Bank v. Brown, 549 S.W.2d 369 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1977).
85. Transcript at 471-72, Crain v. Webster Elec. Coop., 568 S.W.2d 781
(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Transcript at 470-72, Perry v. Briscoe, 568 S.W.2d 283 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1978).
87. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 78.04 provides, in part, that the entry ofjudgment on a jury verdict is entered as of the date of the verdict.
88. Mo.R. Civ.P. 81.05(a).
89. Lawrence v. Steadley Co., 566 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
Gothard v. Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); Corning Bank
v. Hager, 560 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); Gray v. Bryant, 557 S.W.2d
489 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Matthews v. Turner, 549 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1977); Coggburn v. Watts, 540 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976);
Phelps v. Parker, 534 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
90. See In re Purvis, 558 S.W.2d 413,414 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); City of
Sikeston v. Missouri Util. Co., 526 S.W.2d 401, 401 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
91. 557 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
92. Transcript at 84, 557 S.W.2d at 489. Several reported opinions in
dismissing the appeals reproduced the defective entries. See, e.g., Gothard v.
Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978); In re Purvis, 558
S.W.2d 413, 414 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); White v. Robertson-Drago Funeral
Home, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Phelps v. Parker, 534
742 [Vol. 44
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docket entry disposed of all of the issues in the trial court, the appeal was
dismissed because the Springfield court could not be certain whether this
entry, recorded in the transcript, was a judgment entry and therefore
final. 9- Merely labeling the docket entry a final judgment in the transcript
was inadequate.9 4 In order to be able to refile the appeal, the appellant
was then forced to return to the trial court to get the judge's signature on
the judgment six months after the original entry. 95
In some cases, this policy of rejecting appeals from a docket entry in
which there is a finding that one of the parties is entitled to a judgment
quite correctly protects the appellate courts from prematurely reviewing a
decision. It is particularly appropriate for the reviewing court to require a
judgment entry in a multiple claim suit since the findings may be contain-
ed in several different docket entries.9 6 However, in other instances, this
policy can operate very unfairly. In Gray, for example, the fact that no
judgment entry was drawn up was probably an oversight on the part of the
attorneys. All litigation in the trial court had been completed. In such a
case, requiring a separate judgment entry with the judge's signature is an
unnecessary technicality.
As an alternative to dismissal, Judge Flanigan, in his frequent dissents
in these Springfield court decisions, 97 would prefer to see more use made of
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 81.12(c). This rule provides in part: "The
appellate court may, if it seems necessary, order that a supplemental
transcript on appeal shall be prepared and filed by either party or by the
clerk of the trial court including any additional part of the record, pro-
ceeding and evidence .... "198 According to Judge Flanigan, the appellate
court could simply issue an order pursuant to this rule requesting that a
judgment entry be prepared and filed in a supplemental transcript. 99
S.W.2d 278, 279 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976); City ofSikeston v. Missouri Util. Co.,
526 S.W.2d 401, 401 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
93. 557 S.W.2d at 489.
94. See Corley v. McGaugh, 555 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
White v. Robertson-Drago Funeral Home, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1977); Williams v. Williams, 480 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1972).
95. Supp. Transcript at 1-3, Gray v. Bryant, 557 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1977).
96. However, in a multiple claim suit, if the trial judge,, pursuant to the last
clause of the second section of Supreme Court Rule 81.06, designates that a judg-
ment on less than all of the claims is final, that designation need only be made in
the docket entry. A separate judgment entry need not be drafted. See Spires v.
Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Mo. En Banc. 1974); Feinstein v. Edward Liv-
ingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. 1970).
97." See Dampier v. Nichols, 570 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978)
(Flanigan, C.J., dissenting); Gothard v. Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1978) (Flanigan, C.J., dissenting).
98. Mo.R. CIv. P. 81.12(c).
99. Gothard v. Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978)
(Flanigan, C.J., dissenting). See also Whealen v. St. Louis Soft Ball Ass'n, 356
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Once this step is completed, the appellate court would have adequate
jurisdiction for review, thereby obviating the need for dismissal and the
concomitant expense and delay of refiling the appeal.
Another possible solution would be to require that in all judicial cir-
cuits within the Springfield District the court or circuit clerk draft the
judgment entries. Presently, by precedent or rule, nearly all of these cir-
cuits require the attorney for the prevailing party to draw up the judg-
ment.100 However, if the court or clerk had this responsibility, as they
seemingly should, there would be less likelihood of an entry being defective
or nonexistent.
At the present time, however, the Missouri practitioner, in order to en-
sure prompt review, should keep the following steps in mind, particularly
if appealing to the Springfield District of the Court of Appeals:101
(1) Draw up a judgment entry with the requisite language, and
have the circuit judge sign it as soon as possible after the finding is
rendered;
(2) Make certain that the court reporter includes this entry in the
trial transcript; and
(3) Have the entry labeled in the transcript as a final judgment and
include it in the index.
If these steps are followed, it is very unlikely that a reviewing court will
dismiss the appeal because it is unsure whether there is a final judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The final judgment rule has a substantial impact on appeals of circuit
court decisions in Missouri. By restricting review, it prevents premature
appeals in instances where the appellate court cannot be certain that all
matters have been disposed of at the trial level. However, while the objec-
tives of this rule appear sound, the requirement of finality in far too many
Mo. 622, 624, 202 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1947); Feigenbaum v. Van Raalte, 356 Mo.
67, 70, 201 S.W.2d 283, 284 (1947); Gibson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 204
S.W.2d 439, 440 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
100. Rule 6 of the 42ndJudicial Circuit of Missouri is typical: "Counsel for the
prevailing party shall prepare and present to the court, for approval, the judg-
ment, decree, or order to be entered in each case within fifteen (15) days after
such judgment or decree or order is made."
101. There are no reported decisions dismissing appeals on this basis in the
St. Louis or Kansas City Districts of the Court of Appeals. However, the potential
for similar problems does exist in these districts. Apparently attorneys' oversights
are being corrected by the issuance of an order to produce a judgment entry pur-
suant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 81.12(c). See text accompanying notes
98-99 supra. Perhaps the courts are simply overlooking the problem. Should the
magnitude of the problem increase, there is a possibility that the St. Louis District
may adopt the approach of the Springfield court. Conversation with Robert
Ruhland, Director of the Department of Judicial Administration, St. Louis
County (April 20, 1979).
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cases causes hardship for the parties. The rule therefore should be
modified so that Missouri appellate courts have more discretion in whether
to review non-final decisions. Such a change would increase the workload
of this state's already overburdened court of appeals, but that factor must
be weighed against considerations of fairness suggesting that a more
equitable rule be applied.
DOUGLAS Y. CURRAN
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